authority of the Commons even in cases where their own judgment
might guide them otherwise. In very vital treaties probably, being
Englishmen, they would be of the same mind as the rest of
Englishmen. If in such cases they showed a reluctance to act as the
people wished, they would have the same lesson taught them as on
vital and exciting questions of domestic legislation, and the case
is not so likely to happen, for on these internal and organic
questions the interest and the feeling of the peers is often
presumably opposed to that of other classes--they may be anxious not
to relinquish the very power which other classes are anxious to
acquire; but in foreign policy there is no similar antagonism of
interest--a peer and a non-peer have presumably in that matter the
same interest and the same wishes.

Probably, if it were considered to be desirable to give to
Parliament a more direct control over questions of foreign policy
than it possesses now, the better way would be not to require a
formal vote to the treaty clause by clause. This would entail too
much time, and would lead to unnecessary changes in minor details.
It would be enough to let the treaty be laid upon the table of both
Houses, say for fourteen days, and to acquire validity unless
objected to by one House or other before that interval had expired.

II.

This is all which I think I need say on the domestic events which
have changed, or suggested changes, in the English Constitution
since this book was written. But there are also some foreign events
which have illustrated it, and of these I should like to say a few
words.