Naturally, the most striking of these illustrative changes comes
from France. Since 1789 France has always been trying political
experiments, from which others may profit much, though as yet she
herself has profited little. She is now trying one singularly
illustrative of the English Constitution. When the first edition of
this book was published I had great difficulty in persuading many
people that it was possible in a non-monarchical State, for the real
chief of the practical executive--the Premier as we should call him-
-to be nominated and to be removable by the vote of the National
Assembly. The United States and its copies were the only present and
familiar Republics, and in these the system was exactly opposite.
The executive was there appointed by the people as the legislature
was too. No conspicuous example of any other sort of Republic then
existed. But now France has given an example--M. Thiers is (with one
exception) just the chef du pouvoir executif that I endeavoured more
than once in this book to describe. He is appointed by and is
removable by the Assembly. He comes down and speaks in it just as
our Premier does; he is responsible for managing it just as our
Premier is. No one can any longer doubt the possibility of a
republic in which the executive and the legislative authorities were
united and fixed; no one can assert such union to be the
incommunicable attribute of a Constitutional Monarchy. But,
unfortunately, we can as yet only infer from this experiment that
such a Constitution is possible; we cannot as yet say whether it
will be bad or good. The circumstances are very peculiar, and that
in three ways. First, the trial of a specially Parliamentary
Republic, of a Republic where Parliament appoints the Minister, is
made in a nation which has, to say the least of it, no peculiar
aptitude for Parliamentary Government; which has possibly a peculiar