from the form. But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a
cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two
separate resemblances, in what formerly seemed, and really is, perfectly
inseparable. After a little more practice of this kind, we begin to
distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason; that
is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they are in effect
the same and undistinguishable; but still view them in different aspects,
according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible. When we
would consider only the figure of the globe of white marble, we form in
reality an idea both of the figure and colour, but tacitly carry our eye
to its resemblance with the globe of black marble: And in the same
manner, when we would consider its colour only, we turn our view to its
resemblance with the cube of white marble. By this means we accompany our
ideas with a kind of reflection, of which custom renders us, in a great
measure, insensible. A person, who desires us to consider the figure of a
globe of white marble without thinking on its colour, desires an
impossibility but his meaning is, that we should consider the figure and
colour together, but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe
of black marble, or that to any other globe of whatever colour or
substance.




PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,



SECT. I. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF OUR IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.