Whatever has the air of a paradox, and is contrary to the first and most
unprejudiced notions of mankind, is often greedily embraced by
philosophers, as shewing the superiority of their science, which coued
discover opinions so remote from vulgar conception. On the other hand,
anything proposed to us, which causes surprize and admiration, gives such
a satisfaction to the mind, that it indulges itself in those agreeable
emotions, and will never be persuaded that its pleasure is entirely
without foundation. From these dispositions in philosophers and their
disciples arises that mutual complaisance betwixt them; while the former
furnish such plenty of strange and unaccountable opinions, and the latter
so readily believe them. Of this mutual complaisance I cannot give a more
evident instance than in the doctrine of infinite divisibility, with the
examination of which I shall begin this subject of the ideas of space and
time.

It is universally allowed, that the capacity of the mind is limited, and
can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity: And though it
were not allowed, it would be sufficiently evident from the plainest
observation and experience. It is also obvious, that whatever is capable
of being divided in infinitum, must consist of an infinite number of
parts, and that it is impossible to set any bounds to the number of parts,
without setting bounds at the same time to the division. It requires
scarce any, induction to conclude from hence, that the idea, which we
form of any finite quality, is not infinitely divisible, but that by
proper distinctions and separations we may run up this idea to inferior
ones, which will be perfectly simple and indivisible. In rejecting the
infinite capacity of the mind, we suppose it may arrive at an end in the
division of its ideas; nor are there any possible means of evading the
evidence of this conclusion.