them, and not because they are alike or of the same sort with them.

141. But, say you, surely a tangible square is liker to a visible square
than to a visible circle: it has four angles and as many sides: so also
has the visible square: but the visible circle has no such thing, being
bounded by one uniform curve without right lines or angles, which makes
it unfit to represent the tangible square but very fit to represent the
tangible circle. Whence it clearly follows that visible figures are
patterns of, or of the same species with, the respective tangible figures
represented by them: that they are like unto them, and of their own
nature fitted to represent them, as being of the same sort: and that they
are in no respect arbitrary signs, as words.

142. I answer, it must be acknowledged the visible square is fitter than
the visible circle to represent the tangible square, but then it is not
because it is liker, or more of a species with it, but because the
visible square contains in it several distinct parts, whereby to mark the
several distinct corresponding parts of a tangible square, whereas the
visible circle doth not. The square perceived by touch hath four
distinct, equal sides, so also hath it four distinct equal angles. It is
therefore necessary that the visible figure which shall be most proper to
mark it contain four distinct equal parts corresponding to the four sides
of the tangible square, as likewise four other distinct and equal parts
whereby to denote the four equal angles of the tangible square. And
accordingly we see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible
parts, answering to the distinct tangible parts of the figures signified
or suggested by them.

143. But it will not hence follow that any visible figure is like unto,
or of the same species with, its corresponding tangible figure, unless it