be also shown that not only the number but also the kind of the parts be
the same in both. To illustrate this, I observe that visible figures
represent tangible figures much after the same manner that written words
do sounds. Now, in this respect words are not arbitrary, it not being
indifferent what written word stands for any sound: but it is requisite
that each word contain in it so many distinct characters as there are
variations in the sound it stands for. Thus the single letter A is proper
to mark one simple uniform sound; and the word ADULTERY is accommodated
to represent the sound annexed to it, in the formation whereof there
being eight different collisions or modifications of the air by the
organs of speech, each of which produces a difference of sound, it was
fit the word representing it should consist of as many distinct
characters, thereby to mark each particular difference or part of the
whole sound. And yet nobody, I presume, will say the single letter a, or
the word ADULTERY, are like unto, or of the same species with, the
respective sounds by them represented. It is indeed arbitrary that, in
general, letters of any language represent sounds at all: but when that
is once agreed, it is not arbitrary what combination of letters shall
represent this or that particular sound. I leave this with the reader to
pursue, and apply it in his own thoughts.

144. It must be confessed that we are not so apt to confound other signs
with the things signified, or to think them of the same species, as we
are visible and tangible ideas. But a little consideration will show us
how this may be without our supposing them of a like nature. These signs
are constant and universal, their connexion with tangible ideas has been
learnt at our first entrance into the world; and ever since, almost every
moment of our lives, it has been occurring to our thoughts, and fastening
and striking deeper on our minds. When we observe that signs are
variable, and of human institution; when we remember there was a time