idea, or combination of ideas--should exist in an unthinking substance,
or exterior to ALL minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor
can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that
the red and yellow were on the tulip you SAW, since you do not pretend
to SEE that unthinking substance.

HYL. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from
the subject.

PHIL. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to
your distinction between SENSATION and OBJECT; if I take you right,
you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the
mind, the other not.

HYL. True.

PHIL. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking
thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?

HYL. That is my meaning.

PHIL. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it
were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?

HYL. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a
perception.

PHIL. When is the mind said to be active?

HYL. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.