PHIL. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an
act of the will?

HYL. It cannot.

PHIL. The mind therefore is to be accounted ACTIVE in its perceptions
so far forth as VOLITION is included in them?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the
motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in
applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?

HYL. NO.

PHIL. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my
breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But
neither can this be called SMELLING: for, if it were, I should smell
every time I breathed in that manner?

HYL. True.

PHIL. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more
there is--as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at