all--this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive.
Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?

HYL. No, the very same.

PHIL. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or
keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?

HYL. Without doubt.

PHIL. But, doth it in like manner depend on YOUR will that in looking
on this flower you perceive WHITE rather than any other colour? Or,
directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid
seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?

HYL. No, certainly.

PHIL. You are then in these respects altogether passive? HYL.
I am.

PHIL. Tell me now, whether SEEING consists in perceiving light and
colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?

HYL. Without doubt, in the former.

PHIL. Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and
colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were
speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow
from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours,
including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is