History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Year's Truce, 1586c by John Lothrop Motley
page 43 of 48 (89%)
page 43 of 48 (89%)
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prudence, valour, and talent as Philip, could now give all the world to
understand that those who dared to lose a just and decorous respect for him, as this good lady had done, would receive such chastisement as royal power guided by prudent counsel could inflict. Parma assured his sovereign, that, if the conquest of England were effected, that of the Netherlands would be finished with much facility and brevity; but that otherwise, on account of the situation, strength and obstinacy of those people, it would be a very long, perilous, and at best doubtful business. "Three points," he said, "were most vital to the invasion of England-- secrecy, maintenance of the civil war in France, and judicious arrangement of matters in the Provinces." The French, if unoccupied at home, would be sure to make the enterprise so dangerous as to become almost impossible; for it might be laid down as a general maxim that that nation, jealous of Philip's power, had always done and would always do what it could to counteract his purposes. With regard to the Netherlands, it would be desirable to leave a good number of troops in those countries--at least as many as were then stationed there--besides the garrisons, and also to hold many German and Swiss mercenaries in "wartgeld." It would be further desirable that Alexander should take most of the personages of quality and sufficiency in the Provinces over with him to England, in order that they should not make mischief in his absence. With regard to the point of secrecy, that was, in Parma's opinion, the most important of all. All leagues must become more or less public, particularly those contrived at or with Rome. Such being the case, the Queen of England would be well aware of the Spanish projects, and, |
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