besides her militia at home, would levy German infantry and cavalry, and
provide plenty of vessels, relying therein upon Holland and Zeeland,
where ships and sailors were in such abundance. Moreover, the English
and the Netherlanders knew the coasts, currents, tides, shallows,
quicksands, ports, better than did the pilots of any fleets that the King
could send thither. Thus, having his back assured, the enemy would meet
them in front at a disadvantage. Although, notwithstanding this
inequality, the enemy would be beaten, yet if the engagement should be
warm, the Spaniards would receive an amount of damage which could not
fail to be inconvenient, particularly as they would be obliged to land
their troops, and to give battle to those who would be watching their
landing. Moreover the English would be provided with cavalry, of which
his Majesty's forces would have very little, on account of the difficulty
of its embarkation.

The obedient Netherlands would be the proper place in which to organize
the whole expedition. There the regiments could be filled up, provisions
collected, the best way of effecting the passage ascertained, and the
force largely increased without exciting suspicion; but with regard to
the fleet, there were no ports there capacious enough for large vessels.
Antwerp had ceased to be a seaport; but a large number of flat-bottomed
barges, hoys, and other barks, more suitable for transporting soldiers,
could be assembled in Dunkirk, Gravelines, and Newport, which, with some
five-and-twenty larger vessels, would be sufficient to accompany the
fleet.

The Queen, knowing that there were no large ships, nor ports to hold them
in the obedient Provinces, would be unauspicious, if no greater levies
seemed to be making than the exigencies of the Netherlands might
apparently require.