enough to refer your readers to those passages of Mr. Spencer's
"Principles of Psychology" which in any direct intelligible way
refer the phenomena of instinct and heredity generally, to memory on
the part of offspring of the action it bona fide took in the persons
of its forefathers." The reviewer made no reply, and I concluded,
as I have since found correctly, that he could not find the
passages.

True, in his "Principles of Psychology" (vol. ii. p. 195) Mr.
Spencer says that we have only to expand the doctrine that all
intelligence is acquired through experience "so as to make it
include with the experience of each individual the experiences of
all ancestral individuals," &c. This is all very good, but it is
much the same as saying, "We have only got to stand on our heads and
we shall be able to do so and so." We did not see our way to
standing on our heads, and Mr. Spencer did not help us; we had been
accustomed, as I am afraid I must have said usque ad nauseam
already, to lose sight of the physical connection existing between
parents and offspring; we understood from the marriage service that
husband and wife were in a sense one flesh, but not that parents and
children were so also; and without this conception of the matter,
which in its way is just as true as the more commonly received one,
we could not extend the experience of parents to offspring. It was
not in the bond or nexus of our ideas to consider experience as
appertaining to more than a single individual in the common
acceptance of the term; these two ideas were so closely bound
together that wherever the one went the other went perforce. Here,
indeed, in the very passage of Mr. Spencer's just referred to, the
race is throughout regarded as "a series of individuals"--without an
attempt to call attention to that other view, in virtue of which we