are able to extend to many an idea we had been accustomed to confine
to one.

In his chapter on Memory, Mr. Spencer certainly approaches the
Heringian view. He says, "On the one hand, Instinct may be regarded
as a kind of organised memory; on the other, Memory may be regarded
as a kind of incipient instinct" ("Principles of Psychology," ed. 2,
vol. i. p. 445). Here the ball has fallen into his hands, but if he
had got firm hold of it he could not have written, "Instinct MAY BE
regarded as A KIND OF, &c.;" to us there is neither "may be regarded
as" nor "kind of" about it; we require, "Instinct is inherited
memory," with an explanation making it intelligible how memory can
come to be inherited at all. I do not like, again, calling memory
"a kind of incipient instinct;" as Mr. Spencer puts them the words
have a pleasant antithesis, but "instinct is inherited memory"
covers all the ground, and to say that memory is inherited instinct
is surplusage.

Nor does he stick to it long when he says that "instinct is a kind
of organised memory," for two pages later he says that memory, to be
memory at all, must be tolerably conscious or deliberate; he,
therefore (vol. i. p. 447), denies that there can be such a thing as
unconscious memory; but without this it is impossible for us to see
instinct as the "kind of organised memory" which he has just been
calling it, inasmuch as instinct is notably undeliberate and
unreflecting.

A few pages farther on (vol. i. p. 452) he finds himself driven to
unconscious memory after all, and says that "conscious memory passes
into unconscious or organic memory." Having admitted unconscious