recognised " laws of nature " can be said to hold, and
reference-bodies K relative to which these laws do not hold.

But no person whose mode of thought is logical can rest satisfied with
this condition of things. He asks : " How does it come that certain
reference-bodies (or their states of motion) are given priority over
other reference-bodies (or their states of motion) ? What is the
reason for this Preference? In order to show clearly what I mean by
this question, I shall make use of a comparison.

I am standing in front of a gas range. Standing alongside of each
other on the range are two pans so much alike that one may be mistaken
for the other. Both are half full of water. I notice that steam is
being emitted continuously from the one pan, but not from the other. I
am surprised at this, even if I have never seen either a gas range or
a pan before. But if I now notice a luminous something of bluish
colour under the first pan but not under the other, I cease to be
astonished, even if I have never before seen a gas flame. For I can
only say that this bluish something will cause the emission of the
steam, or at least possibly it may do so. If, however, I notice the
bluish something in neither case, and if I observe that the one
continuously emits steam whilst the other does not, then I shall
remain astonished and dissatisfied until I have discovered some
circumstance to which I can attribute the different behaviour of the
two pans.

Analogously, I seek in vain for a real something in classical
mechanics (or in the special theory of relativity) to which I can
attribute the different behaviour of bodies considered with respect to
the reference systems K and K1.* Newton saw this objection and