Moreover, since a narrower construction of the disabling
provision creates more constitutional problems than a
construction of the disabling provisions that permits access to
all constitutionally protected speech, the broader interpretation
is preferable. "[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an
alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible, we
are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems."
INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2279 (2001) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). On the other hand, interpreting
CIPA's disabling provisions to permit disabling for access to all
constitutionally protected speech presents several problems.
First, if "other lawful purpose" means "for the purpose of
accessing constitutionally protected speech," then this reading
renders superfluous CIPA's reference to "bona fide research,"
which clearly contemplates some purpose beyond simply accessing
constitutionally protected speech. In general, "courts should
disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language
superfluous." Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253
(1992).
Furthermore, Congress is clearly capable of explicitly
specifying categories of constitutionally unprotected speech, as
it did when it drafted CIPA to require funding recipients to use
technology protection measures that protect against visual
depictions that are "obscene," "child pornography," or, in the
case of minors, "harmful to minors." CIPA Sec. 1712(a) (codified at
20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(III)); CIPA Sec. 1721(b) (codified
at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(6)(B)(i)(I)-(III)). If Congress intended