CIPA's disabling provisions simply to permit libraries to disable
the filters to allow access to speech falling outside of these
categories, Congress could have drafted the disabling provisions
with greater precision, expressly permitting libraries to disable
the filters "to enable access for any material that is not
obscene, child pornography, or in the case of minors, harmful to
minors," rather than "to enable access for bona fide research or
other lawful purposes," which is the language that Congress
actually chose.


At bottom, however, we need not definitively construe CIPA's
disabling provisions, since it suffices in this case to assume
without deciding that the disabling provisions permit libraries
to allow a patron access to any speech that is constitutionally
protected with respect to that patron. Although this
interpretation raises fewer constitutional problems than a
narrower interpretation, this interpretation of the disabling
provisions nonetheless fails to cure CIPA's lack of narrow
tailoring. Even if the disabling provisions permit public
libraries to allow patrons to access speech that is
constitutionally protected yet erroneously blocked by the
software filters, the requirement that library patrons ask a
state actor's permission to access disfavored content violates
the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has made clear that content-based
restrictions that require recipients to identify themselves
before being granted access to disfavored speech are subject to
no less scrutiny than outright bans on access to such speech. In
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), for example,