Technology Act and Communications Act of 1934 (the two statutes
governing LSTA and E-rate funding, respectively), and at all
events, we think that CIPA is severable.
"The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is
essentially an inquiry into legislative intent." Minn. v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999). "Unless
it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that
which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is
fully operative as a law." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108
(1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is
no doubt that if we were to strike CIPA from the sections of the
United States Code where it is currently codified, the remaining
statutory sections, providing eligible public libraries with E-
rate discounts and LSTA grants, would be fully operative as law.
Indeed, the LSTA and E-rate programs existed prior to the
enactment of CIPA in substantially the same form as they would
exist were we to strike CIPA and leave the rest of the programs
intact.


The second question, whether Congress would in this case
have chosen to repeal the LSTA and E-rate subsidy programs
instead of continuing to fund them if it had known that CIPA's
limitations on these programs were constitutionally invalid, is
less clear. CIPA contains "separability" clauses that state that
if any of its additions to the statutes governing the LSTA and E-
rate programs are found to be unconstitutional, Congress intended
to effectuate as much of CIPA's amendments as possible. We
interpret these clauses to mean, for example, that if a court