were to find that CIPA's requirements are unconstitutional with
respect to adult patrons, but permissible with respect to minors,
that Congress intended to have the court effectuate only the
provisions with respect to minors. These separability clauses do
not speak to the situation before us, however, where we have
found that CIPA is facially unconstitutional in its entirety.


Nevertheless, the government has not pointed to anything in
the legislative history or elsewhere to suggest that Congress
intended to discontinue funding under the LSTA and E-rate
programs unless it could effectuate CIPA's restrictions on the
funding. And Congress's decision, prior to CIPA's enactment, to
subsidize Internet access through the LSTA and E-rate programs
without such restrictions, counsels that we reach the opposite
conclusion. At bottom, we think that it is unclear what
Congress's intent was on this point, and in the absence of such
information, we exercise a presumption in favor of severability.
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984) ("[T]he
presumption is in favor of severability."); cf. Velazquez v.
Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 773 (2d Cir. 1999), aff'd 531
U.S. 533 (2001) (applying a presumption in favor of severability
in the face of uncertainty whether Congress intended to fund the
Legal Services Corporation even if a restriction on the funding
was to be declared invalid).
For the foregoing reasons, we will enter a final judgment
declaring Sections 1712(a)(2) and 1721(b) of the Children's
Internet Protection Act, codified at 20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f) and 47
U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(6), respectively, to be facially invalid under
the First Amendment and permanently enjoining the defendants from