modesty, of joyous maternity, and to who shall say what other graces
and virtues that endear woman to man," that is _chivalry_.

It is not a question of a purely one-sided bargain, as in the
suffragist conception. Nor yet is it a bargain about purely material
things.

It is a bargain in which man gives both material things, and also
things which pertain perhaps somewhat to the spirit; and in which
woman gives back of these last.

But none the less it is of the nature of a contract. There is in it
the inexorable _do ut des; facio ut facias [give me this, and I will
give you that; do this for me, and I will do that for you]._

And the contract is infringed when woman breaks out into violence,
when she jettisons her personal refinement, when she is ungrateful,
and, possibly, when she places a quite extravagantly high estimate
upon her intellectual powers.

We now turn from these almost too intimate questions of personal
morality to discuss the other grievances which were enumerated above.

With regard to the suffragist's complaint that it is _"insulting"_ for
woman to be told that she is as a class unfit to exercise the
suffrage, it is relevant to point out that one is not insulted by
being told about oneself, or one's class, untruths, but only at being
told about oneself, or one's class, truths which one dislikes. And it
is, of course, an offence against ethics to try to dispose of an
unpalatable generalisation by characterising it as "insulting." But