nothing that man could do would be likely to prevent the suffragist
resorting to this aggravated form of intellectual immorality.

We may now turn to the complaint that it is "illogical" to withhold
the vote from women.

This is the kind of complaint which brings out in relief the logical
endowment and legislative sagacity of the suffragist.

With regard to her logical endowment it will suffice to indicate that
the suffragist would appear to regard the promulgation of a rule which
is to hold without exception as an essentially logical act; and the
admission of any class exception to a rule of general application as
an illogicality. It would on this principle be "illogical" to except,
under conscription, the female population from military service.

With regard to the suffragist's legislative sagacity we may note that
she asks that we should put back the clock, and return to the days
when any arbitrary principle might be adduced as a ground for
legislation. It is as if Bentham had never taught:--

"What is it to offer a _good reason_ with respect to a law? It is to
allege the good or evil which the law tends to produce; so much good,
so many arguments in its favour; so much evil, so many arguments
against it.

"What is it to offer a _false reason?_ It is the alleging for, or
against a law, something else than its good or evil effects."

Next, we may take up the question as to whether an unwelcome