organism and brings forth its parts by necessity.) Kant expresses this
in the following way:

'For external objects as phenomena an adequate ground related to
purposes cannot be met with; this, although it lies in nature, must be
sought only in the supersensible substrata of nature, from all possible
insight into which we are cut off. Our understanding has then this
peculiarity as concerns the judgment, that in cognitive understanding
the particular is not determined by the universal and cannot therefore
be derived from it.'

The attempt to prove whether or not another form of reason than this
(the intellectus archetypus) is possible - even though declared to be
beyond man - Kant regarded as superfluous, because the fact was enough
for him 'that we are led to the Idea of it - which contains no
contradiction - in contrast to our discursive understanding, which has
need of images (intellectus ectypus), and to the contingency of its
constitution'.

Kant here brings forward two reasons why it is permissible to conceive
of the existence of an extra-human, archetypal reason. On the one hand
he admits that the existence of our own reason in its present condition
is of a contingent order, and thus does not exclude the possible
existence of a reason differently constituted. On the other hand, he
allows that we can think of a form of reason which in every respect is
the opposite of our own, without meeting any logical inconsistency.

From these definitions emerges a conception of the properties of man's
cognitional powers which agrees exactly with those on which, as we have
seen, Hume built up his whole philosophy. Both allow to the reason a