knowledge-material consisting only of pictures - that is, of pictures
evoked in consciousness through sense-perception, and received by it
from the outer world in the form of disconnected units, whilst denying
it all powers, as Hume expressed it, ever 'to perceive any real
connections between distinct existences'.

This agreement between Kant and Hume must at first sight surprise us,
when we recall that, as already mentioned, Kant worked out his
philosophy precisely to protect the cognizing being of man from the
consequences of Hume's thought. For, as he himself said, it was his
becoming acquainted with Hume's Treatise that 'roused him out of his
dogmatic slumber' and obliged him to reflect on the foundations of
human knowing. We shall understand this apparent paradox, however, if
we take it as a symptom of humanity's close imprisonment in recent
centuries within the limits of its onlooker-consciousness.

In his struggle against Hume, Kant was not concerned to challenge his
opponent's definition of man's reasoning power. His sole object was to
show that, if one accepted this definition, one must not go as far as
Hume in the application of this power. All that Kant could aspire to do
was to protect the ethical from attack by the intellectual part of man,
and to do this by proving that the former belongs to a world into which
the latter has no access. For with his will man belongs to a world of
purposeful doing, whereas the reason, as our quotations have shown, is
incapable even in observing external nature, of comprehending the
wholes within nature which determine natural ends. Still less can it do
this in regard to man, a being who in his actions is integrated into
higher purposes.

Kant's deed is significant in that it correctly drew attention to that