fears of individuals are directed, and by it both the benefits, and
the terrors, and _prestige_ of government are mainly represented to
the public eye. Unless, therefore, the authorities whose office it is
to check the executive are backed by an effective opinion and feeling
in the country, the executive has always the means of setting them
aside or compelling them to subservience, and is sure to be well
supported in doing so. Representative institutions necessarily depend
for permanence upon the readiness of the people to fight for them in
case of their being endangered. If too little valued for this, they
seldom obtain a footing at all, and if they do, are almost sure to be
overthrown as soon as the head of the government, or any party leader
who can muster force for a _coup de main_, is willing to run some
small risk for absolute power.

These considerations relate to the first two causes of failure in a
representative government. The third is when the people want either
the will or the capacity to fulfill the part which belongs to them in
a representative constitution. When nobody, or only some small
fraction, feels the degree of interest in the general affairs of the
state necessary to the formation of a public opinion, the electors
will seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to serve their
private interest, or the interest of their locality, or of some one
with whom they are connected as adherents or dependents. The small
class who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the
representative body, for the most part use it solely as a means of
seeking their fortune. If the executive is weak, the country is
distracted by mere struggles for place; if strong, it makes itself
despotic, at the cheap price of appeasing the representatives, or such
of them as are capable of giving trouble, by a share of the spoil; and
the only fruit produced by national representation is, that in