addition to those who really govern, there is an assembly quartered on
the public, and no abuse in which a portion of the assembly are
interested is at all likely to be removed. When, however, the evil
stops here, the price may be worth paying for the publicity and
discussion which, though not an invariable, are a natural
accompaniment of any, even nominal, representation. In the modern
kingdom of Greece, for example, it can hardly be doubted, that the
place-hunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly, though
they contribute little or nothing directly to good government, nor
even much temper the arbitrary power of the executive, yet keep up the
idea of popular rights, and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the
press which exists in that country. This benefit, however, is entirely
dependent on the coexistence with the popular body of an hereditary
king. If, instead of struggling for the favors of the chief ruler,
these selfish and sordid factions struggled for the chief place
itself, they would certainly, as in Spanish America, keep the country
in a state of chronic revolution and civil war. A despotism, not even
legal, but of illegal violence, would be alternately exercised by a
succession of political adventurers, and the name and forms of
representation would have no effect but to prevent despotism from
attaining the stability and security by which alone its evils can be
mitigated or its few advantages realized.

The preceding are the cases in which representative government can not
permanently exist. There are others in which it possibly might exist,
but in which some other form of government would be preferable. These
are principally when the people, in order to advance in civilization,
have some lesson to learn, some habit not yet acquired, to the
acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an
impediment.