subject to paternal power terminates the power of the parent.
In either case, however, if the condemned person is pardoned
by the grace of the Emperor, he recovers all his former rights.
2 Relegation to an island does not extinguish paternal power,
whether it is the parent or the child who is relegated. 3 Again,
a father's power is extinguished by his becoming a `slave of
punishment,' for instance, by being condemned to the mines or
exposed to wild beasts. 4 A person in paternal power does
not become independent by entering the army or becoming a
senator, for military service or consular dignity does not set a
son free from the power of his father. But by our constitution
the supreme dignity of the patriciate frees a son from power
immediately on the receipt of the imperial patent; for who would
allow anything so unreasonable as that, while a father is able by
emancipation to release his son from the tie of his power, the
imperial majesty should be unable to release from dependence
on another the man whom it has selected as a father of the State?
5 Again, capture of the father by the enemy makes him a slave
of the latter; but the status of his children is suspended by his
right of subsequent restoration by postliminium; for on escape
from captivity a man recovers all his former rights, and among
them the right of paternal power over his children, the law of
postliminium resting on a fiction that the captive has never
been absent from the state. But if he dies in captivity the son is
reckoned to have been independent from the moment of his
father's capture. So too, if a son or a grandson is captured by
the enemy, the power of his ascendant is provisionally suspended,
though he may again be subjected to it by postliminium. This
term is derived from ‘limen’ and ‘post,’ which explains why we
say that the person who has been captured by the enemy and