of a devotee amongst the ancient Romans. Now, considering that
the word _religion_ is originally Roman, [probably from the
Etruscan,] it seems probable that it presented the idea of religion
under some one of its bad aspects. Coleridge must quite have forgotten
this Paganism of the word, when he suggested as a plausible idea,
that originally it had presented religion under the aspect of
a coercion or restraint. Morality having been viewed as the prime
restraint or obligation resting upon man, then Coleridge thought that
religion might have been viewed as a _religatio_, a reiterated
restraint, or secondary obligation. This is ingenious, but it
will not do. It is cracked in the ring. Perhaps as many as three
objections might be mustered to such a derivation: but the last of
the three is conclusive. The ancients never _did_ view morality
as a mode of obligation: I affirm this peremptorily; and with the
more emphasis, because there are great consequences suspended upon
that question.]

What, then, is religion? Decomposed into its elements, as they are
found in Christianity, how many _powers_ for acting on the
heart of man, does, by possibility, this great agency include?
According to my own view, four.[Footnote: there are _six_,
in one sense, of religion: viz. 5_thly_, corresponding moral
affections; 6_thly_, a suitable life. But this applies to
religion as _subjectively possessed_ by a man, not to religion
as _objectively contemplated_. ] I will state them, and number
them.

1st. A form of worship, a _cultus_.

2dly. An idea of God; and (pointing the analysis to Christianity