follow. Even partial success developed hostile elements slumbering in
various parts of the country, and running from Boston almost to the
extreme West.

In this view of the case, these riots assume a magnitude and importance
that one cannot contemplate without a feeling of terror, and the truth of
history requires that their proper place should be assigned them, and
those who put them down have an honorable position beside our successful
commanders and brave soldiers. It is also important, as a lesson for the
future, and naturally brings up the question, what are the best measures,
and what is the best policy for the city of New York to adopt, in order to
protect itself from that which to-day constitutes its greatest danger--
_mob violence?_ If it ever falls in ruins, the work of destruction
will commence and end within its own limits. We have a police and city
military which have been thought to be sufficient, but experience has
shown that though this provision may be ample to restore law and order in
the end, it works slowly, often unwisely, and always with an unnecessary
expenditure of life. In conversing with those of largest experience and
intelligence in the police department on this subject of such great and
growing importance, we are convinced, from their statements and views, a
vast improvement in this matter can be made, while the cost to the city,
instead of being increased, will be lessened; that is, a cheaper, wiser,
and more effectual plan than the present one can be adopted. Of course
this does not refer to mere local disturbances, which the police force in
the ordinary discharge of its duties can quell, but to those great
outbreaks which make it necessary to call out the military. Not that there
might not be exigencies in which it would be necessary to resort, not only
to the military of the city, but to invoke the aid of neighboring States;
for a riot may assume the proportions of a revolution, but for such no
local permanent remedy can be furnished.