The objections to relying on the military, as we invariably do in case of
a large mob, are many. In the first place, it takes the best part of a day
to get the troops together, so that a mob, so far as they are concerned,
has time not only to waste and destroy for many hours, but increase in
strength and audacity. The members of the various regiments are scattered
all over the city, engaged in different occupations and employments, and
without previous notice being given, it is a long and tedious process to
get them to their respective headquarters and in uniform. This wastes much
and most valuable time. Besides, they are compelled to reach the mustering
place singly or in small groups, and hence liable to be cut off or driven
back by the mob, which in most cases would know the place of rendezvous.

In the second place, the members are taken out from the mass of the
people, between whom there might be a strong sympathy in some particular
outbreak, which would impair their efficiency, and make them hesitate to
shoot down their friends and acquaintances.

In the third place, in ordinary peace times, these uniformed regiments are
not the steadiest or most reliable troops, as was witnessed in the riots
of 1863, as well as in those of the Astor Place in 1849.

They hesitate, or are apt to become hasty or disorganized in a close,
confused fight, and driven back. In the commencement of a riot, a defeat
of the military gives increased confidence, and indeed, power to a mob,
and snakes the sacrifice of life, in the end, far greater.

In the fourth place, clearing the streets does not always dissipate a mob.
A whole block of houses may become a fortress, which it is necessary to
storm before a permanent victory is gained. Half-disciplined men,