grew in intensity until the end. Shah Soojah himself soon discovered
that his authority over his people was almost nominal; and although he
chafed at our continued presence in the country, he also felt that the
day of our departure would be the last of his reign, and that our
withdrawal was under the circumstances impossible. But the situation was
equally complicated from our own point of view. If, as originally
promised, the British troops were withdrawn, the failure of the
expedition would at once become apparent by the anarchy which would
ensue. On the other hand, to retain an army in the far-distant mountains
of Afghanistan would not only be a breach of faith, but, while entailing
enormous expense, would deprive India of soldiers who might be required
elsewhere.

After lengthy consideration, it was decided to reduce the total of our
force in the country, while retaining a hold for the present on Cabul,
Ghuznee, and Candahar, together with the passes of the Kyber and Bolam.
In short, the British army was weakly scattered about in a region of
mountains, amongst a hostile people, and with its long lines of
communication insufficiently guarded. Both in a military and a political
point of view the position was a false and dangerous one.

General Sir John Keane, who was about to return to India, writing at
the time, said 'Mark my words, it will not be long before there is here
some signal catastrophe.' During the summer of 1840 there were troubles
both in the Kyber and Bolam passes. In the former the tribes, incensed
at not receiving sufficient subsidies, attacked the outposts and
plundered our stores; while in Beloochistan matters were so serious that
a British force was sent, and captured Khelat, the Khan being killed,
and part of his territory handed over to Shah Soojah. [Footnote: In the
life of Sir Robert Sandeman, recently published, it is stated that the