alleged treachery of Mehrab Khan, which cost him his life, was on
subsequent inquiry not confirmed.] Rumours from Central Asia also added
to our anxieties. Although the failure of the Russian attempt on Khiva
became known some months later, it excited apprehension at the time
amongst our political officers in Cabul. Sir Alexander Burnes, during
the winter of 1839, expressed opinions which were curiously inconsistent
with each other. 'I maintain,' he said, 'that man to be an enemy to his
country who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of the Indus;
'while at the same moment he advocated the advance of our troops over
the Hindoo Koosh into Balkh, so as to be ready to meet the Russians in
the following May.

Sir William McNaghten, the chief political officer in Cabul, went still
further, and in April 1840 not only urged a march on Bokhara, but also
contemplated sending a Mission to Kokand, in order, as he said, 'to
frustrate the knavish tricks of the Russians in that quarter.'

Our position, however, at that time was sufficiently precarious without
adding to our anxieties by distant expeditions in Central Asia, even had
the Russians established themselves in the Principalities, which at that
time was not the case. Not only was Afghanistan itself seething with
treachery and intrigues from one end to the other, but the Sikhs in the
Punjaub, our nominal allies, had, since the death of Runjeet Singh,
become disloyal and out of hand. Beloochistan was in tumult; the tribes
in the Kyber, ever ready for mischief, incessantly threatened our
communications; so that we were certainly in no condition to enter upon
further dangerous expeditions against distant imaginary foes.

Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Commander-in-Chief, strongly objected to any
advance. 'In truth,' he said, 'we are much weaker now than in 1838.'