During the latter months of 1840, and in 1841, matters became steadily
worse, and all Afghanistan seemed ripe for revolt. 'We are in a stew
here,' wrote Sir William McNaghten in September; 'it is reported that
the whole country on this side the Oxus is up in favour of Dost Mahomed,
who is certainly advancing in great strength.' Again, in a letter to
Lord Auckland, he said 'that affairs in this quarter have the worst
possible appearance'--and he quoted the opinion of Sir Willoughby
Cotton, that 'unless the Bengal troops are instantly strengthened we
cannot hold the country.'

At this critical period, however, Dost Mahomed was heavily defeated at
Bamian, on the Hindoo Koosh, voluntarily surrendering shortly
afterwards, and for the moment prospects looked brighter; but the clouds
soon gathered again, and the end was at hand.

The Governor-General of India had throughout the whole war wisely and
steadfastly resisted the proposed further operations in Central Asia;
and the Court of Directors in London wrote as follows: 'We pronounce our
decided opinion that, for many years to come, the restored monarchy will
have need of a British force in order to maintain peace in its own
territory, and prevent aggression from without.' And they go on: 'We
again desire you seriously to consider which of the two alternatives (a
speedy retreat from Afghanistan, or a considerable increase of the
military force in that country) you may feel it your duty to adopt. We
are convinced that you have no middle course to pursue with safety and
with, honour.' The Government of India, hesitating to the last, failed
in adopting either of the alternatives.

In November, 1841, Sir Alexander Burnes was treacherously murdered by a