mob in Cabul, which was followed by an insurrection, and the defeat of
our troops. General Elphinstone, who was in command, writing to Sir W.
McNaghten on November 24, said that 'from the want of provisions and
forage, the reduced state of our troops, the large number of wounded and
sick, the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated
cantonment we occupy, the near approach of winter, our communications
cut off, no prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms against
us, I am of opinion that it is not feasible any longer to maintain our
position in this country, and that you ought to avail yourself of the
offer to negotiate that has been made to you.'

This was conclusive. Our Envoy early in December met the Afghan chiefs,
and agreed that we should immediately evacuate the country, and that
Dost Mahomed, who was in exile in India, should return. On December 23,
Sir William McNaghten was treacherously murdered at a conference with
the Afghan Sirdars, within sight of the British cantonment, and then
came the end.

The British force at Cabul, leaving its guns, stores and treasure
behind, commenced its retreat on January 6, 1842; but incessantly
attacked during its march, and almost annihilated in the Koord Cabul
Pass, it ceased to exist as an organised body. General Elphinstone and
other officers, invited to a conference by Akbar Khan, were forcibly
detained as hostages, and on January 13 a solitary Englishman (Dr.
Brydon) arrived at Jellalabad, being, with the exception of a few
prisoners, the sole remaining representative of the force.

I have given this short sketch of the first Afghan war because,
disastrous as it was, the causes of our failure were due throughout far
more to rash and mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the British