De Amicitia, Scipio's Dream by Marcus Tullius Cicero
page 52 of 83 (62%)
page 52 of 83 (62%)
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for a capital crime, he, in accordance with his own conviction, voted
his friendy guilty, but so influenced the minds of his two associates that they gave their voice for his acquittal.] incur absolute dishonor. There is a point up to which a concession made to friendship is venial. But we are not bound to be careless of our own reputation, nor ought we to regard the esteem of our fellow-citizens as an instrument of such affairs as devolve upon us,--an esteem which it is base to conciliate [footnote: Latin, _colligere,_ to collect, or gather up, one by one, the good-will of each individual citizen.] by flattery and fawning. Virtue, which has the sincere regard of the people as its consequence, is by no means to be sacrificed to friendship. But, to return to Scipio, who was all the time talking about friendship, he often complained that men exercised greater care about all other matters; that one could always tell how many goats and sheep he had, but could not tell how many friends he had; and that men were careful in selecting their beasts, but were negligent in the choice of friends, and had nothing like marks and tokens [footnote: Latin, _signa et notas,_ the marks and tokens by which the quality and worth of goats and sheep were estimated.] by which to determine the fitness of friends. Firm, steadfast, self-consistent men are to be chosen as friends, and of this kind of men there is a great dearth. It is very difficult to judge of character before we have tested it; but we can test it only after firendship is begun. Thus friendship is prone to outrun judgment, and to render a fair trial impossible. It is therefore the part of a wise man to arrest the impulse of kindly feeling, as we check a carriage in its course, that, as we use only horses that have been tried, so we may avail ourselves of friendships in which the characters of our friends |
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