Still further good faith is essential to the maintenance of the
stability and constancy which we demand in friendship, for nothing that
is unfaithful is stable. It is, moreover, fitting to choose tor a friend
one who is frank, affable, accommodating, interested in the same things
with ourselves,--all which qualities come under the head of fidelity,
for a changeful and wily disposition cannot be faithful, nor can he who
has not like interests and a kindred nature with his friend be either
faithful or stable. I ought to add that a friend should neither take
pleasure in finding fault with his friend, nor give credit to the
charges which others may bring against him,--all which is implied in the
constancy of which I have been speaking. Thus we come back to the truth
which I announced at the beginning of our conversation, that friendship
can exist only between the good. It is, indeed, the part of a good or--
what is the same thing--a wise man [Footnote: Wisdom and goodness were
identical with the Stoics.] to adhere to these two principles in
friendship,--first, that he tolerate no feigning or dissembling (for an
ingenuous man will rather show even open hatred than hide his feeling by
his face), and, secondly, that he not only repel charges made against
his friend by others, but that he be not himself suspicious, and always
thinking that his friend has done something unfriendly.

To these requisites there may well be added suavity of speech and
manners, which is of no little worth as giving a relish to the
intercourse of friendship. Rigidness and austerity of demeanor on every
occasion indeed carry weight with them, but friendship ought to be more
gentle and mild, and more inclined to all that is genial and affable.

19 There occurs here a question by no means difficult,[Footnote: Latin,
_subdifficilis_ which I should render _somewhat difficult_ had not
Cicero treat that question as one that presents no difficulty. In the