intended to become.

To be happy then was to be virtuous, to be virtuous was to be
rational, to be rational was to follow Nature, and to follow Nature
was to obey God. Virtue imparted to life that even flow in which Zeno
declared happiness to consist. This was attained when one's own
genius was in harmony with the will that disposed of all things.

Virtue having been purified from all the dross of the emotions, came
out as something purely intellectual, so that the Stoics agreed with
the Socratic conception that virtue is knowledge. They also took on
from Plato the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Temperance, Courage,
and Justice, and defined them as so many branches of knowledge.
Against these were set four cardinal vices of Folly, Intemperance,
Cowardice, and Injustice. Under both the virtues and vices there was
an elaborate classification of specific qualities. But
notwithstanding the care with which the Stoics divided and subdivided
the virtues, virtue, according to their doctrine, was all the time
one and indivisible. For virtue was simply reason and reason, if it
were there, must control every department of conduct alike. 'He who
has one virtue has all,' was a paradox with which the Greek thought
was already familiar. But Chrysippus went beyond this, declaring that
he who displayed one virtue did thereby display all. Neither was the
man perfect who did not possess all the virtues, nor was the act
perfect which did not involve them all. Where the virtues differed
from one another was merely in the order in which they put things.
Each was primarily itself, secondarily all the rest. Wisdom had to
determine what it was right to do, but this involved the other
virtues. Temperance had to impart stability to the impulses, but how
could the term 'temperate' be applied to a man who deserted his post