through cowardice, or who failed to return a deposit through avarice,
which is a form of injustice, or yet to one who misconducted affairs
through rashness, which falls under folly? Courage had to face
dangers and difficulties, but it was not courage unless its cause
were just. Indeed one of the ways in which courage was defined was a
virtue fighting on behalf of justice. Similarly justice put first the
assigning to each man his due, but in the act of doing so had to
bring in the other virtues. In short, it was the business of the man
of virtue to know and to do what ought to be done, for what ought to
be done implied wisdom in choice, courage in endurance, justice in
assignment and temperance in abiding by ones conviction. One virtue
never acted by itself, but always on the advice of a committee. The
obverse to this paradox--He who has one vice has all vices--was a
conclusion which the Stoics did not shrink from drawing. One might
lose part of one's Corinthian ware and still retain the rest, but to
lose one virtue--if virtue could be lost--would be to lose all along
with it.

We have now encountered the first paradox of Stoicism, and can
discern its origin in the identification of virtue with pure reason.
In getting forth the novelties in Zeno's teaching, Cicero mentions
that, while his predecessors had recognized virtues due to nature and
habit, he made all dependent upon reason. A natural consequence of
this was the reassertion of the position which Plato held or wished
to hold, namely, that virtue can be taught. But the part played by
nature in virtue cannot be ignored. It was not in the power of Zeno
to alter facts. All he could do was to legislate as to names. And
this he did vigorously. Nothing was to be called virtue which was not
of the nature of reason and knowledge, but still it had to be
admitted that nature supplied the starting points for the four