extremists, who made most generous promises. But the non-socialist groups
were beginning to take a stronger line, as they saw the experiments of the
extremists lead to disillusionment. They proposed to organize councils and
congresses of the non-socialist elements. This project was immediately
branded as counter-revolutionary by "revolutionary democracy." Perhaps to
ward off the contemplated move of the non-socialists, Kerensky issued a
general invitation for a state conference at Moscow of all parties, groups,
and organizations, at which the opinions of all could be expressed,
presumably for the guidance of the Coalition Government.

The Moscow Conference did in fact give to all organizations, Duma, Councils
of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, the recently elected local-government
bodies, cooeperative and professional unions, in fact every group, socialist
and non-socialist, revolutionary and pre-revolutionary institutions, the
opportunity to express views. The speeches did perhaps help the Coalition
Government to sense the situation with which it had to deal, though the
Conference showed that the Coalition Government was unstable, and that
the extreme ideas of the Bolsheviki had penetrated deeply in the broader
masses. Again the Bolsheviki attacked the principle of coalition, and
demanded that revolutionary democracy take over all authority.

Then came the Kornilov affair, which in its conception was an effort on
the part of the constructive groups, including the moderate socialists, to
discredit the extremists, and establish a stronger government, free from
party ties and party programs, representing a national movement to organize
"all the vital forces of the country," to use again the phraseology of
the revolution. But there was a misunderstanding, and also perhaps it was
premature--"revolutionary democracy" was not yet sufficiently sobered
to accept a program of common constructive effort. The movement had the
opposite effect; it split the country into two openly hostile camps, and