was not as important as it has since become. The east coast of the
Adriatic was a wild hinterland that might be left to the rude peoples
of Montenegro and Albania. But it has come into the world since then.
Add to this that the Italian shore of the Adriatic is notably without
good harbors and indefensible, and one has all the elements of the
strategic situation. All fears would be superfluous if Austria, the old
bully at the north, would keep quiet: the Triple Alliance served well
enough for over thirty years. But would Austria play fair with an
unsympathetic ally that she had not taken into her confidence when
she determined to violate the first term of the Triple Alliance?

All this may now be pondered in the "Green Book," more briefly and
cogently in the admirable statement which Italy made to the Powers when
she declared war on Austria. That the Italian Government was not only
within its treaty rights in demanding those "compensations" from Austria,
but would have been craven to pass the incident of the attack on Serbia
without notice, seems to me clear. That it was a real necessity, not a
mere trading question, for Italy to secure a stronger frontier and control
of the Adriatic, seems to me equally obvious. These, I take it, were the
vital considerations, not the situation of the "unredeemed" Italians in
Trent and Trieste. But Austria, in that grudging maximum of concession
which she finally offered to Italy's minimum of demand, insisted upon
taking the sentimental or knavish view of the Italian attitude: she would
yield the more Italianated parts of the territory in dispute, not the
vitally strategic places. Nor would she deliver her concessions until
after the conclusion of the war--if ever!--after she had got what use
there was from the Italians enrolled in her armies fighting Russia. For
Vienna to regard the tender principle of nationalism is a good enough
joke, as we say. Her persistence in considering Italy's demands as either
greed or sentiment is proof of Teutonic lack of imagination. The Italians