are sentimental, but they are even more practical. It was not the woes of
the "unredeemed" that led the Salandra Government to reject the final
offering of Austria, and to accept the risks of war instead. It was rather
the very practical consideration of that indefensible frontier, which
Austria stubbornly refused to make safe for Italy--after she had given
cause, by her attack upon Serbia, to render all her neighbors uneasy in
their minds for their safety.

So much for the sentimental and the strategical threads in the Consulta
negotiations. It was neither for sentiment nor for strategical advantage
solely that Italy finally entered the war. Nevertheless, if the German
Powers had frankly and freely from the start recognized Italy's position,
and surrendered to her _immediate_ possession--as they were ready to do
at the last moment--sufficient of those national aspirations to safeguard
national security, with hands off in the Adriatic, Italy most probably
would have preferred to remain neutral. I cannot believe that Salandra
or the King really wanted war. They were sincerely struggling to keep
their nation out of the European melting-pot as long as they could. But
they were both shrewd and patriotic enough not to content themselves with
present security at the price of ultimate danger. And if they had been as
weak as the King of Greece, as subservient as the King of Bulgaria, they
would have had to reckon with a very different people from the Bulgars and
the Greeks--a nation that might quite conceivably have turned Italy into a
republic and ranged her beside her Latin sister on the north in the world
struggle. The path of peace was in no way the path of prudence for the
House of Savoy.

* * * * *

Lack of imagination is surely one of the prominent characteristics of